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Policy Memo 1, October 2016 
Secondary objectives
 
 
 in auctions 
 
  
Short about the project 
Auctions for Renewable Energy Support: Effective use and efficient implementation options (AURES)
This project helps assessing the applicability of different auction types to renewable support under different market 
conditions. It also explores which auction types and design specificat
goals in European countries. By establishing best practices and a knowledge sharing network, we contribute to 
informed policy decision-making and to the success of auction implementations across Europe.
Target-oriented analysis: Through analysis of empirical experiences, experiments and simulation, we will create a 
flexible policy support tool that supports policy makers in deciding on the applicability of auction types and certain 
design specifications for their specific situation.
Capacity building activities: We undertake specific implementation cases to derive best practices and trigger 
knowledge sharing amongst Member States. We strive to create a strong network with workshops, webinars, 
bilateral meetings, newsletters, a website that will serve as capacity building platform for both policy makers and 
market participants (including project developers, auctioneers,etc.). Wherever required, we can set up specific 
bilateral and multilateral meetings on specific a
Additionally, we offer sparring on specific implementation options, drawing from insights gained during the first 
phases of the project (empirical analysis of previous auctions in Europe and t
analysis on the applicability of specific designs in certain market conditions and for certain policy goals issues and 
facilitate cooperation and knowledge sharing. Additionally, we offer sparring on specific implement
drawing from insights gained during the first phases of the project (empirical analysis of previous auctions in 
Europe and the world), conceptual and theoretical analysis on the applicability of specific designs in certain market 
conditions and for certain policy goals. 
Project consortium: eight renowned public institutions and private firms from five European countries and 
combines some of the leading energy policy experts in Europe, with an impressive track record of successful 
research and coordination projects. 
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This report deals with possible measures to ensure secondary objectives in an 
auction by assessing bids along criteria other than price. It is one in a series of 
four Policy Memos published by the AURES project:
Policy Memo 1: Secondary objectives in auctions
Policy Memo 2: Pre-qualifications and penalties
Policy Memo 3: The effect of award types on auction outcomes
Policy Memo 4: The effect of competition levels on auction outcomes
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1. Including secondary objectives in auctions 
Auctions are an appropriate allocation mechanism to identify market prices. But apart from getting the lowest 
price, the auctioneer may pursue further objectives in an auction, which may include: 
 a certain geographic distribution 
 development of the domestic industry and value chain 
 actor diversity or the promotion of certain actor types 
 system integration 
 certain technical characteristics of projects 
A policy maker may choose to address secondary objectives within the auction design itself or outside of the 
auction design, for instance by implementing regulation pertaining to spatial planning, industrial policy, or 
electricity markets. This policy memo focuses on ways of addressing secondary objectives in the form of a 
design element within the auction. Measures outside the auction design are described where they are 
especially relevant, or where there is no satisfactory way to address a secondary objective within the auction. 
Table 1 lists possible measures, which will be analysed in more detail in Section 2Fejl! Henvisningskilde 
ikke fundet..  
When including a secondary objective directly in an auction design, the basic options are i) to include it as a 
non-price criterion in the auction itself, or ii) to include it in the selection process of eligible projects, for 
instance in the form of a material pre-qualification criterion, by introducing contingents, or by exempting 
certain groups of projects from auctions and offering them alternative support.  
If the secondary objective is considered as a criterion in the auction itself, all projects can participate, but 
those which perform well in the requested criterion are rewarded with extra points and are thus more likely to 
win. Various scoring options exist for such multi-criteria auctions. Most commonly, each submitted bid is given 
scores for the price criterion and each non-price criterion on a pre-defined scale.  With regard to weighting the 
scores, the most common method is the linear weighting method in which a weight is assigned to each 
criterion in advance (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015). Weighted scores are then added up to define a bidder’s 
overall score. However, more complex methods can be used for calculating overall scores, for instance 
applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process, multi-attribute analysis, or fuzzy sets (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015). 
Pre-qualification criteria are discussed in this Memo as measures to implement certain secondary objectives. 
However, pre-qualification criteria are also used to filter out weak bidders and to ensure a high realisation 
chance of winning projects. These aspects are discussed in Policy Memo 2: Pre-qualifications and penalties. 
 
Table 1 – Possible measures to implement non-price criteria in an auction 
Objective Measure 
Geographic distribution Contingents for certain location types/regions 
Pre-qualification criterion for desired location types/regions 
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Criterion in auction to favour desired location types/regions 
Reference yield model 
Development of domestic 
industry 
Pre-qualification criterion for minimum local content 
Criterion in auction to favour projects with high local content 
Actor diversity Reduced financial pre-qualification (penalty) for small actors 
Reduced material pre-qualifications (building permits, grid access,…) 
Differentiation of pricing rules for small and large actors 
Exemption of small actors from auction scheme ; remuneration by an 
administratively set FIP 
Exemption of small actors from auction scheme ; remuneration at 
winning price of a previous auction round. 
Contingents for small actors 
Boni for small actors 
System integration Remuneration award metric sensitive to electricity market prices 
Deep connection cost charging 
Technical specifications Separate auctions for separate technology classes 
Contingents for technologies with certain specifications 
Criterion in auction to favour desired technical specification 
Boni for desired technical specifications/ mali for undesired specifications 
 
2. Assessment of measures 
Geographic distribution 
A policy maker may want to steer the geographical distribution of winning projects in an auction, for instance 
in order to avoid the creation of hot-spots, to coordinate RES deployment with the existing grid and with grid 
expansion plans, to reduce producer rents, or for political or social acceptability reasons. For this purpose, the 
policy maker may want to favour a certain distribution across areas (specific provinces or regions) or location 
types (farmland, fallow land, marginal strips of roads or railways, etc.). 
Measures to influence the geographic distribution of winning projects are only relevant for multiple-item 
auctions. In single-item auctions, a specific site is pre-developed by the responsible public authority, and the 
location of the site is thus not part of the auction result. Table 2 describes each measure and its expected 
effect on the outcome of an auction. 
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Table 2 – Measures to steer geographic distribution 
Contingents for favoured location types or regions 
Description of the 
measure 
A minimum share of the target volume is reserved for projects situated in a 
certain region or location type which is favoured for the above-mentioned 
reasons but in which projects tend to have higher generation costs, making 
them less competitive on price alone. A variation on this measure is to instead 
define a maximum contingent for non-favoured locations.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
Awarding projects with higher generation costs will reduce the static efficiency 
of the auction scheme and can be expected to increase support costs.  
Any contingent requires many of the same considerations from the policy 
maker as the whole auction did: Is there enough supply within the contingent to 
create competition, given the demand created by the contingent size? If there 
is more than one contingent (i.e. for several different location types), the sum 
of all contingents should be considerably smaller than the total auction volume, 
thus leaving enough free volume for installations who win solely based on 
price. Contingents usually require the definition of a separate maximum price. 
Uniform prices across contingents are not advisable due to the expected 
systematic differences in price. A discriminatory pricing rule should be applied 
instead.  
Pre-qualification criterion for desired location types/regions 
Description of the 
measure 
Projects can only participate in the auction if they are located in a specific 
region or a specific location type.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
Conceptually, this measure entails that a separate auction is undertaken for the 
desired location type. Other auction rounds may or may not be undertaken for 
the other location types filtered out by the pre-qualification criterion – such as, 
for instance in the first rounds of the German PV auctions, introduced in 2015, 
in which installations on agricultural land were filtered out by a pre-qualification 
criterion. No separate auctions were held for installations on agricultural land 
because, although usually featuring lower generation costs, installations on this 
location type were at the time not politically desired by the policy maker.   
Filtering out lower-cost installations in this measure results in reduced static 
efficiency and higher support costs. Target volumes need to be reviewed and, if 
necessary, adapted to the lower supply expected due to filtering out part of the 
bidders.  
Criterion in auction to favour desired location types or regions 
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Description of the 
measure 
Projects from all locations can participate, but those from the desired 
locations/regions receive extra points and therefore have a higher likelihood of 
winning.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
This measure does not reduce supply, as bidders from non-favoured locations 
can still participate. Target volumes thus do not need to be adjusted.  
The generation costs, and therefore also the bidding prices of winners can be 
expected to increase.  
 
 
 
 
Reference yield model 
Description of the 
measure 
Projects from all locations can participate. No specific type of location is 
favoured. However, difference in resource yield are evened out by higher 
prices being paid to weak resource locations and lower prices to strong 
resource locations. All bidders bid a price which is adjusted to an average 
“reference location”, which makes projects comparable. The actual price paid 
later to winning projects is determined by whether their actual yield is above or 
below the reference yield. 
Effects on auction 
outcome 
If a certain geographic distribution is the regulator’s objective, this measure 
addresses it only indirectly and in a rather complex manner. Setting the 
parameters in a way that make good projects still slightly more competitive, but 
not too much so, is very difficult.   
A reference yield model is applied in Germany’s current administratively set FIP 
scheme for onshore wind and was also discussed during the set-up of the 
auction design. 
 
Development of the domestic industry, value chain and innovation clusters 
Policy makers may have an interest in promoting the development of domestic industry, innovation capacity, 
industrial cluster creation, or to positively influence domestic labour markets. Note that clearly favouring 
domestically manufactured materials may not comply with laws and regulations which aim to ensure a fair 
competition between local and imported products. For instance, EU member states are obliged to follow EU 
internal market regulations which severely restrict their possibilities of subsidising or otherwise favouring their 
own industries over those of other member states. Openly requiring a minimum local content, for instance, is 
therefore not an option for RES auctions within the EU.  
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A number of options exist to influence domestic industry development and labour markets through targeted 
measures outside of auctions, for instance through the creation of innovation clusters and through training 
programmes. An analysis of these is not undertaken here. However, targeted measures outside of auctions 
may in many cases be more cost-efficient and thus it may be preferable to including them in auctions. 
 
Table 3 – Measures to influence the development of domestic industry and value chain 
Pre-qualification criterion for minimum local content or labour force structure 
Description of the 
measure 
Only those bidders may participate in the auction who can demonstrate a 
certain local content or a desired labour force structure.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
This measure makes projects with high local content / a certain labour force 
structure more competitive. It may deter some bidders, for instance foreign 
ones, from participating in the auction, thus potentially limiting competition. The 
need for a downward adjustment of the target volume thus needs to be 
investigated.   
Generation costs may increase, for instance if bidders compete for locally 
manufactured components, thus driving up their prices. These effects are 
expected to be especially pronounced in small markets and/or the 
implementation of very large projects. 
Examples from real-life applications include the Danish single-item auction for 
an offshore wind farm Horns Rev 3, in which bidders had to show that a certain 
number of trainees will be involved in wind farm construction; the South African 
REIPPPP auctions in which projects have to demonstrate a minimum 
ownership share by black citizens and local communities as well as effects on 
job creation and enterprise development (del Río, 2016); and the UK CfD 
auctions in which projects larger than 300 MW have to submit a supply chain 
plan to show how their project would promote innovation, competition, and 
skills (Fitch-Roy and Woodman, 2016). In the Brazilian onshore wind auctions, 
a local content pre-qualification criterion was not part of the auction itself, but 
was necessary for project developers to obtain a subsidised loan under the 
FINAME programme, without which bidders were not likely to be competitive in 
the auctions (Förster and Amazo, 2016).  
Criterion in auction to favour projects with high local content or desired labour force structure 
Description of the 
measure 
The auction is held as a multi-criteria auction in which a high local content or a 
desired labour force structure increases the overall score of a bidder. 
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Effects on auction 
outcome 
The effects with regard to bidder competitiveness and generation costs are the 
same as described above for pre-qualifications. 
 
Applied examples include the Chinese onshore wind concession auctions, in 
which bidders were required to prove local content which together with other 
non-price criteria accounted for up to 75% of bidders’ scores. The measure 
lead to the development of a local supply chain, as the domestic market in 
China was big enough to account for some competition among domestic 
component manufacturers (Steinhilber, 2016). In the Portuguese wind auctions 
of 2006-2008, a non-price criterion including the development of industrial 
clusters, the technical management of a project, and promotion of innovation 
accounted for 20% of a bidder’s score (del Río, 2016).  
 
Actor diversity 
Policy makers can have an interest in favouring a certain mix of actor types, for instance one with a minimum 
share of small or local actors. Such considerations are often connected to public acceptability concerns, as 
small and local actors are expected to be more rooted in the communities affected by renewables 
installations, thus making them more acceptable to the public. A regulator can also have an interest in keeping 
actors diverse in order to ensure high competition in the market in the long run. 
The following measures focus on the promotion of small actors, as this is the most common group to be 
targeted by such measures. However, most of the measures can also be applied to other desired actor types. 
No matter which actor type is selected to receive preferential treatment, there will be an incentive for all actors 
to fall into the favoured category, in some cases adapting the legal form or shareholder structure of the 
project-owning entity accordingly. A careful legal definition of the favoured actor category is thus crucial to 
prevent non-eligible actors from slipping in.  
Small actors can be faced with two problems:  
 they can have systematically higher generation costs than large actors, due to their lacking 
economies of scale. However, this is not necessarily true for all technologies in all markets and thus 
needs to be explored by each policy maker in detail; 
 they are not able to spread their risks as well as large actors due to their typically smaller project 
portfolio. This constraint applies to varying degrees for varying technologies and is especially true for 
technologies in which larger projects are the norm. Small actors with the capacity to develop only one 
or very few projects may be deterred from this by the risk of their project not being awarded in the 
auction, leaving them unable to spread their sunk costs over a large portfolio. 
The following actor definitions and measures address either both or one of these problems.  
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Table 4 summarises possible methods of defining small actors. While the definition can be based directly on 
actor characteristics, it can also be based on project characteristics, with the implicit assumption that small 
projects tend to be carried out by small actors.  
 
Table 4 – Methods of defining small actors. Source: Actor definitions are adapted from Tiedemann et al. (2015) who 
provided a similar assessment to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.  
Definition by actor characteristics 
Description The bidder developing the project is classified as a small actor by criteria such as their 
shareholder structure, frequency of developing projects, or whether they fall into the SME 
category according to the European Commission recommendation (L124/36).  
Germany currently considers preferential treatment for citizen cooperatives, by which a 
citizen cooperative is defined as being owned by at least 10 local natural persons with 
together 51% of voting rights, developing a maximum of one project per year (BMWi, 
2016). Another example is France, where bidders in the PV auctions must be the owner of 
the building and maintain the installation (Förster, 2016). 
Assessment For the SME definition to be applicable, interconnections between the entity holding 
project ownership and possible larger mother companies must be identifiable to the 
regulator. There is also a danger of large players transferring ownership of a RES project 
to SMEs just before the auction with the specific purpose of receiving special treatment. 
Such strategic behaviour must be prevented, for instance by requiring the entity that holds 
project ownership to be classified as an SME at least from the auction to project 
realisation.  
Conflicts with EU laws and regulations are possible, as in the case of generation-based 
support, state aid regulation refers to exceptions for small installations rather than small 
actors. In addition, favouring “local” persons may also be problematic from a legal view.  
Definition by project size (de-minimis threshold) 
Description The current state aid regulation already foresees a de-minimis threshold, allowing RES 
installations of less than 1 MW, or less than 6 MW/less than 6 generation units in the case 
of wind, to receive support without going through a competitive bidding process (European 
Commission, 2014, Art. 42).  
Assessment This definition assumes that a correlation exists between small installations and small 
actors. At least for wind projects in Germany, such a correlation could not be confirmed 
(Grashof, 2015). A definition by project size is thus not suitable to achieve the aim of 
favouring small actors. For other technologies or markets, the degree of correlation would 
need to be explored before putting in place a de-minimis definition. However, de-minimis 
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rules might be adequate measures for pursuing other policy goals such as limiting 
transaction costs of the auction etc. 
 
 
Definition by potential frequency of auction participation 
Description In any given year, an actor may potentially participate in auctions with all those projects 
which have obtained the necessary material pre-qualifications (i.e. building permits etc.). 
Large actors will usually have more such projects in their portfolio per year than small 
actors.  
Assessment The frequency of participation correlates strongly with the actor’s risk of being awarded, 
which is especially high for small actors with just one or very few projects. The criterion is 
thus well suited to identify the group that should be favoured. However, the criterion is 
also prone to misuse, as large mother companies will have an incentive to hide their 
affiliation with small project companies in order to ensure favourable treatment for them. 
To address this, small actors could for instance be asked to register with the regulator and 
be subjected to random examinations to ensure their eligibility for small actor status. 
However, such a process requires time and resources. Furthermore, this definition could 
potentially result in a reduced number of offered projects, thus reduced competition, as 
companies can speculate on the benefits of reducing their participation frequency. 
Definition for single projects 
Description Similar to the definition by auction frequency, it is also possible to allow a small actor to 
get favourable treatment for one single project. Such a definition would benefit citizen 
cooperatives which exist just to realise one specific project in their area.  
Assessment The number of actors covered by this definition is expected to be small. Many small actors 
have more than one project and would not benefit from beneficial treatment. Small multi-
project actors would have to enter full competition with their second project, which would 
only delay but not remove the barriers they face.  
 
 
Once the favoured actor group is clearly defined, the policy maker must decide which measures shall be 
applied to provide better outcomes for this group, as shown in Table 5.  
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Table 5 – Measures to steer actor diversity. Source: Measures and their effects are adapted from Tiedemann et al. (2015) 
who provided a similar assessment to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy; and on Kitzing et al. 
(2016).  
Reduced financial pre-qualification (penalty) for small actors 
Description of the 
measure 
Financial pre-qualifications deposited by auction participants usually serve as 
penalties, as they are not paid back to winning bidders who do not realise their 
projects in time. Such pre-qualification requirements can be reduced for small 
actors. For this purpose, financial pre-qualifications may either be split up in 
two steps, by which a small actor deposits only a small amount at first and the 
full amount only upon winning; requiring no pre-qualification at all without 
penalising them for non-realisation or delay; or requiring no pre-qualification 
and applying alternative penalties (reduction of support amount or duration) to 
prevent delay. 
Effects on auction 
outcome 
The measure will strengthen the position of small actors versus the banks from 
whom they need to obtain financing. With lower costs of capital, small actors 
are able to bid more competitive prices in the auction.  
All varieties of the measure can be expected to negatively affect realisation 
rates and thus the effectiveness of the auction. This is especially true for the 
approach with no penalties, which for this reason is not recommended. While 
the two-stepped approach and the alternative penalty approach are also likely 
to decrease the rate of on-time realisation, they will do this to a lesser extent 
that may be justified by the benefits of increased actor diversity. 
Reduced material pre-qualifications 
Description of the 
measure 
Small actors may enter the auction with reduced material pre-qualifications 
such as complete building permits or grid access guarantees at their chosen 
sites.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
The measure reduces risks for small actors as they can participate in the 
auction earlier in their project planning process, thus obtaining certainty about 
whether their project will or will not receive support before having undertaken 
costly studies to receive permits. However, if the small actors are allowed to 
place their bids at an early stage of project development, this may lead to them 
misjudging their actual costs or resource quality, thus resulting in the winner’s 
curse.  Rational small actors would react to this by adding a risk premium to 
their bid price, which again would make them less competitive in the auction.  
The measure would require an adaptation of realisation deadlines for small 
actors. It may also have negative effects on realisation rates, if small bidders 
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misjudge their actual costs. On the other hand, citizen cooperatives can have a 
high probability of project realisation due to high local involvement, thus 
balancing out this effect.  
Differentiation of pricing rules for small and large actors 
Description of the 
measure 
Small and large actors participate in the same auction. While the uniform-price 
(lowest rejected bid) rule is applied to small actors, the pay-as-bid pricing rule 
applies to all others.  This measure is based on the assumption that small 
actors are more risk-averse and have access to less market information to 
judge competition levels. 
Effects on auction 
outcome 
Under a pay-as-bid rule, risk-averse small actors would place lower bids, 
possible below cost. Under a uniform price with lowest rejected bid, rational 
small actors have an incentive to place bids at their true cost. However, past 
examples show that inexperienced bidders often act irrationally by bidding too 
low under a uniform price rule, which can reduce realisation rates.  
The risk of not being awarded is reduced but still remains for small actors, thus 
potentially still deterring them from participation in the auction. 
Contingents for small actors 
Description of the 
measure 
A minimum share of the auction target volume is reserved for small actors, 
even if other actors’ prices are lower.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
This measure increases the probability of winning for small actors, as those 
small actor projects with the lowest bids will be awarded at least until the 
contingent is full. If small actor projects routinely place higher bids than other 
projects, this will result in higher support expenditures. The contingent must be 
small enough to still ensure sufficient competition among small actors.  
It is likely that separate maximum prices would be necessary for projects in- 
and outside of the contingent. Especially if large price differences are expected 
between small-actor projects and other winning projects, contingents are not 
suitable be combined with a uniform-pricing rule, as this would generate 
unnecessarily high producer rents. 
This measure is advisable if small actors face systematically higher costs than 
other actors, which is not necessarily true for all markets or technologies. 
However, small actors still face some risk of not being awarded despite 
incurring sunk costs for project pre-development, which may deter them from 
participating in the auction at all. 
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Any contingent requires many of the same considerations from the policy 
maker as the whole auction did: Is there enough supply within the contingent to 
create competition, given the demand created by the contingent size? If there 
is more than one contingent (i.e. for several different actor types), the sum of 
all contingents should be considerably smaller than the total auction volume, 
thus leaving enough free volume for installations who win solely based on 
price. 
Boni for small actors 
Description of the 
measure 
Winning small actors receive a bonus on top of the price resulting from the 
auction. An administrative component is thus added to the competitive price 
finding mechanism.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
This measure would increase the probability of winning for small actors. It 
results in higher prices being paid to small actors, thus increasing support 
expenditures. Setting an appropriate amount for the bonus is difficult, will likely 
have to be adapted over time, and may thus become the subject of regular 
political controversy.  
This measure is advisable if small actors face systematically higher costs than 
other actors, which is not necessarily true for all markets or technologies. 
However, small actors still face an award risk and may thus be deterred by the 
sunk costs for project pre-development. 
Size limits on bids 
Description of the 
measure 
The total size of bids per seller is limited, e.g. to x MW.   
Effects on auction 
outcome 
This measure is primarily targeted at avoiding seller concentration, but may in 
some cases be favourable for small actors. If there is a correlation between 
actor size and project size (which is not always the case, as mentioned above), 
limiting the size of projects would also limit economies of scale for large actors, 
thus making the smaller actors’ smaller projects more competitive.  
The effect of this measure on small actors is rather indirect and is therefore not 
recommended as the primary measure to support small actors. However, if a 
policy maker wants to limit seller concentration at the same time, this measure 
can be useful.  
Exemption of small actors from auction scheme ; remuneration at administratively set support level 
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Description of the 
measure 
Small actors are not required to participate in auctions. Instead, they receive 
support under a feed-in premium scheme with an administratively set support 
level.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
This measure is suitable to address the risk of small actors of not being 
awarded. It also gives small actors good information on what level of support 
they can expect, thus reducing uncertainty. The measure can also be used to 
support small actors with structurally higher generation costs than large actors, 
as support levels can be adjusted by the regulator.  
The regulator will partly lose volume control by exempting actors from the 
auction. The number of actors covered by this exemption should thus be kept 
small. Auction target volumes may have to be adjusted downwards to 
compensate for the deployment outside of auctions. If administratively set 
support levels are higher than auction results, this will drive up total support 
costs.  
The legal feasibility of this measure considering current state aid regulation 
requires closer analysis. 
Exemption of small actors from auction scheme; remuneration at winning price of a previous 
auction round(s). 
Description of the 
measure 
Small actors are not required to participate in auctions. Instead, they receive 
support under a FIP scheme. The support level is determined by the result 
(highest accepted bid) of a previous auction for the same technology in which 
large actors are required to participate. Where available, the weighted average 
result of several past auction rounds is used. 
Effects on auction 
outcome 
This measure is suitable to address the risk of small actors of not being 
awarded. It also gives small actors good information on what level of support 
they can expect, thus reducing uncertainty. On the other hand, this measure is 
not suitable to support small actors who have structurally higher generation 
costs than large actors, as the winning price is determined by the large actors’ 
marginal bid.  
The regulator will partly lose volume control by exempting actors from the 
auction. The number of actors covered by this exemption should thus be kept 
small. Auction target volumes may have to be adjusted downwards to 
compensate for the deployment outside of auctions. However, depending on 
how much the target volume is reduced, higher competition in the auction may 
lead to lower prices, which may in turn be unfeasible for small actors, thus 
limiting realisation rates outside the auction. 
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Partial reimbursement of project development costs for unsuccessful bidders 
Description of the 
measure 
Unsuccessful actors are partly reimbursed for project development costs after 
a project has repeatedly been entered in auctions without winning. 
Effects on auction 
outcome 
The measure reduces the risk of small actors of not recovering their sunk cost 
in case of an unsuccessful bid, thus making auctions more attractive to them. 
However, setting the reimbursement amount is extremely difficult. If set too 
low, the measure has no effect. If set too high, this will reduce the incentive to 
develop excellent projects with good chances of winning. The measure is also 
prone to abuse, as actors might buy up bad projects and enter them in the 
auction just to receive the reimbursement. This measure is therefore not 
recommended. 
Advisory services and bid quality control for small bidders 
Description of the 
measure 
Small actors receive advice on bidding strategies and effects of auctions on 
their business model. The quality of bids (correctness and completeness) is 
checked before the bid is officially submitted. 
Effects on auction 
outcome 
The measure reduces uncertainties and thus increases acceptance of the 
auctioning mechanism among small bidders. It therefore addresses the 
problem of small bidders being deterred from auctions due to their complexity. 
It does not address the problem of small bidders having structurally higher 
generation costs. 
The measure causes higher transaction costs to the auctioneer, who needs to 
finance the advisory service. This measure is in addition to providing well-
structured and easily accessible auction information to all bidders, which 
should be done in any case. 
 
System integration 
Renewables, especially variable renewable technologies, cause integration costs. These include balancing 
costs due to deviations from day-ahead production forecasts, grid-related costs due to the location of 
renewables plants being resource- rather than load-related, and profile costs caused by the tendency of 
variable renewables to generate at the same time, thus reducing the market value of their electricity (Hirth et 
al., 2015). At increasing shares of renewable electricity, policy makers have a growing interest ensuring a low-
cost integration of renewables into their energy system. System integration may be ensured by steering the 
geographical distribution of renewables installations, the timing of their generation, or by subjecting them to 
forecasting and balancing requirements. Typical measures applied to other parts of the electricity system 
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include requiring conventional plants to generate more flexibly, coupling electricity and heat markets, and 
introducing demand side response mechanisms.   
This policy memo makes no attempt at evaluating which of these measures are most effective in reducing 
integration costs. Nonetheless, Table 6 describes measures to promote system integration as part of a 
renewables auction design and assesses their possible effects on the auction outcome. 
 
Table 6 – Measures to promote system integration 
Remuneration award metric sensitive to electricity market prices 
Description of the 
measure 
Remuneration is paid in the form of a FIP (fixed or sliding) or investment grant 
based on a reference electricity price (see also Policy Memo 3), thus 
incentivising producers to design their plants to have low correlation with other 
plants’ generation profiles. Under current state aid regulation, generation-
based support is required to be paid in the form of a FIP in EU Member States.   
Effects on auction 
outcome 
Fixed FIPs and investment grants require bidders to predict future electricity 
price developments over the lifetime of their plant. Bidders will incorporate this 
risk in their calculations in the form of a risk premium. It is likely that the bidders 
with the most optimistic price predictions will win the auction, thus increasing 
the risk of Winner’s Curse.  
In addition, in the case of investment grants, project developers may be 
incentivised to implement plant designs which are undesirable from a system 
perspective (e.g. regarding rotor-generator-ratios in wind power plants).  
Sliding FIPs require a lower degree of electricity price predictions by bidders 
and therefore do not increase the risk of Winner’s Curse.  
 
Deep connection cost charging 
Description of the 
measure 
Bidders are required to bear the full cost of connecting their planned 
installation to the grid (deep charging approach). 
Effects on auction 
outcome 
Bidders will incorporate the cost of connection into their bid prices, thus 
increasing support costs. System costs, on the other hand, are likely to be 
lowered as developers will take into account connection costs when choosing 
their sites (in case of multiple-item auctions). However, this measure puts an 
unduly high burden on RES installations for grid development measures from 
which other actors will also benefit, and which should thus be commonly 
financed. Furthermore, it may prevent participation from smaller companies, 
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who do not have sufficient expertise in grid development. This measure is 
therefore not recommended. 
 
Technical specifications 
Policy makers may have an interest in promoting certain technical specifications in an auction, be it 
technology-specific or technology-neutral. Examples might include efficient CHP technology in a biomass 
auction, innovative technologies such as thin-film in a PV auction, certain environmental standards in a hydro 
power auction, or technical prerequisites for system integration. 
Conceptually, treating certain technical specifications separately is no different from differentiating between 
RES technologies (such as onshore wind, hydro, PV, etc.). Similar pros and cons apply as for technology-
neutral vs. –specific support scheme designs: Providing favourable treatment for a certain technological 
design is a political decision, as the favoured technology is protected from free competition with other, 
potentially lower-cost options. This may lead to higher support costs in the short term. On the other hand, the 
dynamic efficiency of the support scheme can be increased by favouring higher-cost but promising technology 
segments.  Insufficient competition within each individual segment is a risk, especially for smaller and more 
specialised technology segments. 
For our purpose, we assume that the technical specifications in question lead to higher generation costs, are 
thus less competitive, and therefore need to be supported by special measures. 
  
Table 7 – Measures to promote desired technical specifications 
Separate auctions for installations with certain specifications 
Description of the 
measure 
Support for the favoured installations type is allocated in a separate auction, in 
which only installations of this type participate. The principle is thus the same 
as for auctions limited to a certain technology, for instance PV or hydro.   
Effects on auction 
outcome 
Requiring compliance with a certain technical specification may increase 
generation costs and thus lower static efficiency. Higher generation costs can 
be expected to be reflected in higher prices in the auction. 
At the same time, the technical requirement will eliminate some bidders from 
the auction. The regulator must take precautions to ensure that the resulting 
lower competition does not result in excessive support costs, for instance by 
adjusting the target volume downwards in accordance with expected supply.   
Contingents for technologies with certain specifications 
Description of the A minimum contingent is defined for installations complying with a certain 
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measure technical specification.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
Requiring compliance with a certain technical specification may increase 
generation costs and thus lower static efficiency. Higher generation costs can 
be expected to be reflected in higher prices offered within the contingent than 
outside of it. 
Any contingent requires many of the same considerations from the policy 
maker as the whole auction did: Is there enough supply within the contingent to 
create competition, given the demand created by the contingent size? If there 
is more than one contingent (i.e. for several different technical specifications), 
the sum of all contingents should be considerably smaller than the total auction 
volume, thus leaving enough free volume for installations who win solely based 
on price. A discriminatory pricing rule should be applied, as uniform prices 
across contingents are not advisable due to the expected systematic 
differences in price. 
Criterion in auction to favour desired technical specification 
Description of the 
measure 
The auction is held as a multi-criteria auction in which compliance with the 
desired technical specification increases the overall score of a bidder.  
Effects on auction 
outcome 
Requiring compliance with a certain technical specification may increase 
generation costs and thus lower static efficiency. Higher generation costs can 
be expected to be reflected in higher prices in the auction. 
An example are the French PV auctions, in which the installations’ CO2 
footprints are included as a criterion. Starting from 2013, this criterion can 
contribute 33% of the total score (Förster, 2016).  
Boni for desired technical specifications 
Description of the 
measure 
Bidders submit a price offer and receive a bonus if they also comply with the 
technical specification.  
Alternatively, bidders may also receive mali in case their project displays 
undesired specifications. 
Effects on auction 
outcome 
This measure increases the competitiveness of bidders who comply with the 
desired specification. Effectively, this measure leads to the same result as the 
previous measure, where the specification is considered in an extra criterion 
within the auction.  
 
 
                    
 
 17 
 
3. Conclusions 
A variety of measures are available to implement secondary objectives in auctions. All secondary objectives 
can also be targeted by measures outside of the auction design. The objective of enhancing the development 
of the domestic industry and value chain is in most cases better addressed by such outside measures. For 
the other secondary objectives discussed here, suitable auction design elements exist. All secondary 
objectives carry a potential trade-off with efficiency and effectiveness. 
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